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1INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Each of the amici curiae is a professor of economics
who has specialized in the area of health care or a
professor of law who has studied, taught, published, or
practiced in the area of Constitutional Law.
Amici submit this brief to articulate and support a
set of principles at the intersection of constitutional
law and economics: namely, that the Constitution does
not embody a particular economic theory; that
economic legislation enjoys a strong presumption of
constitutionality; and that in this particular case the
complex economic judgments underlying the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act are committed to
the legislative branch and are beyond the
constitutional authority of the judicial branch.  
Amici are:
Prof. Richard L. Aynes, University of Akron School of
Law; Assoc. Prof. David S. Cohen, Earle Mack School
of Law at Drexel University; Assoc. Prof. Cindy
Galway Buys, Southern Illinois University School of
Law; Prof. Wilson R. Huhn, University of Akron School
of Law; Prof. Richard Saphire, University of Dayton
School of Law; Prof. Robert H. Smith, Suffolk
  Counsel for all parties received notice of amici’s intent to file1
this brief at least ten days prior to the due date; all parties have
consented to this filing. Under Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court,
amici state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No
person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
2University Law School; Prof. Emeritus Lloyd B.
Snyder, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Prof.
Katherine Swartz, Harvard University; Prof. Rebecca
Zietlow, University of Toledo College of Law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During the 19  century and the beginning of theth
20  century the Supreme Court took the position thatth
the Constitution embodied the economic theory of
laissez faire and it struck down state and federal
legislation that was inconsistent with that theory. 
After 1937 the Supreme Court rejected that notion and
instead embraced the healthy principle that the
Constitution does not embody any particular economic
theory.  This change was appropriate because the
changing and competing models and theories that are
used to explain and predict human economic behavior
are suited to legislative decision-making but have no
place in the judicial responsibility to interpret the
meaning of the Constitution.  The principle of
separation of powers requires the courts to defer to
Congress on questions of economic policy.  As a
consequence, the Court should uphold the
constitutionality of the individual mandate of the
PPACA.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY
ANY PARTICULAR ECONOMIC THEORY 
It has been suggested that the individual mandate
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the
3power to force people to purchase a product that they
do not wish to purchase; that this constitutes an
unconstitutional interference with the operation of the
free market.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Sebelius, 728
F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d for lack of
jurisdiction 656 F.3d 252 (4  Cir. 2011).  In strikingth
down the individual mandate the District Court
stated: “At its core, this dispute is not simply about
regulating the business of insurance – or crafting a
scheme of universal health insurance coverage – it’s
about an individual’s right to choose not to
participate.”  Id. at 788.
In 1905 in the case of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared
that “a Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory.”  Id. at 75.  Holmes was
writing in dissent, because at that time the Supreme
Court had most definitely interpreted the Constitution
to incorporate one particular school of economics. 
Holmes wrote: 
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the state or of laissez faire.  It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar, or novel, and even
shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying
them conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.  198 U.S., at 75 (Holmes, J.
dissenting).
4Consistent with Holmes’ dissent, the Constitution
itself does not mandate or even mention any particular
economic theory. Despite the silence of the
Constitution on this point, the Supreme Court of that
era embraced the notion that there is a constitutional
right to be free of government regulation in the use of
one’s property.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 450 (1857) (striking down law that
prohibited slavery in the northern territories of the
United States upon the ground that this constituted a
violation of slaveholders’ constitutional right to
property); Lochner, (striking down maximum hour
legislation); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (striking down a statute protecting the right to
belong to a union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (same); and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage law
for women and children as violation of Due Process
rights of employers).  In all of these cases the Court
ruled that the rights of property were entitled to broad
constitutional protection from interference by
legislatures.  While it is certainly true that the
Constitution prohibits legislatures from depriving
persons of certain vested rights, taking private
property for public use without just compensation,
interfering with the obligation of contracts, or
depriving people of property without due process of
law, the Supreme Court of that era also extended
constitutional protection to the economic advantage
that the ownership of property confers upon its owner
in the marketplace.  The Court explained its rationale
for this theory in Coppage, where it stated that
inequalities of bargaining power are inherent in the
right of property and that legislatures are therefore
constitutionally powerless to redress inequalities
arising from the ownership of property:
5No doubt, wherever the right of private property
exists, there must and will be inequalities of
fortune; and thus it naturally happens that
parties negotiating about a contract are not
equally unhampered by circumstances.  …  And,
since it is self-evident that, unless all things are
held in common, some persons must have more
property than others, it is from the nature of
things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the
same time recognizing as legitimate those
inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights.  236 U.S.,
at 17.
In 1937 in the case of Parrish v. West Coast Hotel,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law),
the Supreme Court overruled Adkins and declared that
“freedom of contract” would no longer be recognized as
a constitutional principle.  The Court stated:  “In each
case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum
wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom
of contract.  What is this freedom?  The Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract.”  Id. at 391.  In
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court
added:  “The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner,
Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due
process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional
when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely -
has long since been discarded.”  Id. at 730.  Instead,
the Court adopted Holmes’ view that the Constitution
does not embody any particular economic theory:
We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was
free to decide for itself that legislation was
needed to deal with the business of debt
6adjusting. …  Whether the legislature takes for
its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer,
Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of
ours.  The Kansas debt adjusting statute may
be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed,
lies not with us but with the body constituted to
pass laws for the State of Kansas.  Id. at 732.
In 1992, in the case of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) the Supreme Court explained that the Lochner
line of cases was overruled because the Supreme Court
had erred in adopting the theory of laissez faire as a
constitutional principle.  It was an error – “a
fundamentally false assumption” – for the justices to
have treated their faith in “a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare” as
a fundamental principle of constitutional law. Id. at
861-862.  
Accordingly, the Constitution is no longer
considered to embody the economic theory of laissez
faire or interpreted to protect the rights of property
against government regulation.  But neither has the
Supreme Court chosen to incorporate redistributivist
principles into the Constitution.  See Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (no constitutional
right to welfare); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972) (no constitutional right to subsidized housing);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (no constitutional
right to public funding for abortion).  In the area of
Equal Protection, the Supreme Court has declined to
treat the poor as a suspect class or wealth as a suspect
classification. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Independent School District, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973)
(stating, “[T]his Court has never heretofore held that
7wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate
basis for invoking strict scrutiny”).  Similarly, the
Court has acknowledged that the Due Process Clause
does not favor labor over capital.  See Lincoln Federal
Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (stating, “Just as
we have held that the due process clause erects no
obstacle to block legislative protection of union
members, we now hold that legislative protection can
be afforded non-union workers.”)  The Constitution
does not take sides between the rich and the poor nor
does it dictate economic policy.
Accordingly, the courts must accord great deference
to the judgment of Congress regarding the
constitutionality of economic legislation.
II. IN A BROAD RANGE OF AREAS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THE SUPREME
COURT HAS RULED THAT IN REVIEWING
T H E  V A L I D I T Y  O F  E C O N O M I C
LEGISLATION THE COURTS MUST DEFER
TO LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT, TO THE
EXTENT THAT THIS PRINCIPLE MUST BE
CONSIDERED TO BE AN ASPECT OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The Supreme Court has ruled in a broad range of
areas in constitutional law that economic legislation is
presumed constitutional and that the courts are not to
substitute their judgment on economic matters for that
of the legislature.  In various cases interpreting the
Due Process Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the
General Welfare Clause, the Commerce Clause, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court
has stated:
8[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such
a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators. 
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152 (1938) (Stone, J.) (upholding federal
law against challenge under Due Process
Clause). 
[T]o be constitutional … It is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it. 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955) (Douglas, J.) (unanimous decision)
(upholding state law against challenge under
Equal Protection Clause). 
We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)
(Black, J.) (unanimous decision) (upholding
state law against challenge under Due Process
Clause).
 
[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of
the facts and testimony before them, have a
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce,
our investigation is at an end.   Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 274 303-304 (1964) (Clark,
9J.) (unanimous decision with concurring
opinions by Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, JJ.)
(upholding federal law under Commerce
Clause).
It is by now well established that legislative
Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of
economic life come to the Court with a
presumption of constitutionality, and that the
burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has
acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.  Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976) (Marshall, J.) (upholding federal law
against challenge under Due Process Clause). 
Although parties challenging legislation under
the Equal Protection Clause may introduce
evidence supporting their claim that it is
irrational, United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-154 (1938), they cannot
prevail so long as “it is evident from all the
considerations presented to [the legislature],
and those of which we may take judicial notice,
that the question is at least debatable.” Id., at
154. Where there was evidence before the
legislature reasonably supporting the
classification, litigants may not procure
invalidation of the legislation merely by
tendering evidence in court that the legislature
was mistaken.  Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)
(Brennan, J.) (footnote omitted) (upholding
state law against challenge under  Equal
Protection Clause).  
 
10
[Referring to] the strong deference accorded
legislation in the field of national economic
policy….  Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
R.A. Gray & Co., 476 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)
(Brennan, J.) (unanimous decision upholding
federal law against challenge under Due
Process Clause).
In considering whether a particular expenditure
is intended to serve general public purposes,
courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress.  South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Rehnquist, J.) (upholding
federal law under General Welfare Clause).
[I]n determining whether the Necessary and
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative
authority to enact a particular federal statute,
we look to see whether the statute constitutes a
means that is rationally related to the
implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.  United States v. Comstock,
__ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (Breyer,
J.) (upholding federal law under Necessary and
Proper Clause).
The principle that the courts must defer to
legislatures in the formation of economic policy infuses
the Constitution.  It is so pervasive that it must be
considered a fundamental aspect of the doctrine of
Separation of Powers.
In the landmark case of Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (unanimous decision upholding
allotment program of federal Agricultural Adjustment
Act against challenge under Commerce Clause),
11
Justice Robert Jackson explained why the courts are
disabled from second-guessing the judgment of
legislatures on economic questions:
The conflicts of economic interest between the
regulated and those who advantage by it are
wisely left under our system to resolution by the
Congress under its more flexible and
responsible legislative process.  Such conflicts
rarely lend themselves to judicial
determination.  Id. at 129 (Jackson, J.).
The allocation of economic burdens and benefits among
classes of persons necessarily involves compromise.
Compromise among economic interests is appropriate
in the formation of economic policy by the legislative
branch, but it has no place in the interpretation of the
Constitution by the judicial branch.
The following section of this brief identifies a
number of economic factors that Congress had to
consider in designing the PPACA.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IS SUITED TO
THE LEGISLATIVE DUTY TO DEVELOP
PUBLIC POLICY BUT IS NOT
COMPATIBLE WITH THE JUDICIAL
DUTY TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION
In deciding whether to enact the individual
mandate as part of the PPACA, Congress had to
consider a host of interrelated factors including the
following: the cost of health care in the United States;
the cost of health insurance; the extent of out-of-pocket
expenses for health care; the increase in the cost of
12
health insurance relative to increases in personal
income and the cost of living; the absolute and relative
cost borne by persons in different income groups; the
extent and effect of cost-shifting under current law;
and the number and effect of personal bankruptcies
attributable to the cost of health care.  Most
importantly, Congress had to assess the state of the
nation’s health and the effect of the lack of adequate
insurance upon people’s health.  
In deciding whether the nation’s system of paying
for medical care ought to be reformed, Congress also
had to evaluate the cost and effectiveness of current
federally funded programs, including Medicare, 42
U.S.C. § 1395, Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, the
National Health Service Corps, 42 U.S.C. § 254d, the
Veterans Health Administration, 38 U.S.C. § 7401,
and federally funded community health centers, 42
U.S.C. § 254b.  For purposes of comparison, Congress
had to familiarize itself with the details of the health
care delivery systems in other countries as well as the
relative cost and efficacy of those programs.  Once
again, a prime consideration was whether the people
of other countries enjoy better health than American
citizens.
 
Congress also had to predict the likely effect of the
PPACA on all of the previously mentioned cost and
health factors.  Specifically, Congress sought to
anticipate the likely effect of insurance reforms,
including guaranteed issue regardless of health;
guaranteed coverage of preexisting conditions;
complete coverage for preventive care; coverage for
adult children; and minimum medical loss ratios.  It
had to determine the level of federal subsidies to
individuals and families of different income groups
13
that would be necessary to enable them to purchase
health insurance and offset out-of-pocket expenses; the
future cost of federal contributions to the states that
would be necessary to pay for the expansion of
Medicaid; and the extent and mix of tax increases and
spending reductions that would be necessary to pay for
these reforms.
In keeping with our constitutional tradition that
the states have served as laboratories for
experimentation in governing, Congress also examined
the efficacy of health insurance reform in the various
states and modeled the PPACA after the plan that was
adopted in Massachusetts in 2006, Mass. St. 2006, c.
58 (An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality,
Accountable Health Care).
In making these determinations Congress had at
its disposal an array of economic studies from various
sources, including the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality,  the Office of the Actuary of the Centers2
for Medicare and Medicaid Services,  the3
  See, e.g., Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,2
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, HCUP Facts and Figures
2009, at http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/factsandfigures/2009/
TOC_2009.jsp (containing data relating to the cost and efficacy of
hospital care in the United States).
  See, e.g., Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare and3
Medicaid Services, Estimated Effects of the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act” as Proposed by the Senate Majority Leader on
November 18, 2009 (December 10, 2009), at http://src.senate.gov/
files/OACTMemorandumonFinancialImpactofPPAA%28HR359
0%29%2812-10-09%29.pdf#page=1 (estimating the effect of the
proposed PPACA on health care coverage and total health
expenditures).
14
Congressional Budget office,  the Joint Commission on4
Taxation,  the Commonwealth Fund,  the Organisation5 6
for Economic and Cooperative Development,  the7
World Health Organization of the United Nations,  the8
  See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Letter to Nancy Pelosi,4
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Preliminary Estimate of
the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the
Reconciliation Legislation Combined with H.R. 3590 as Passed by
the Senate (March 18, 2010), at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/
doc11355/hr4872.pdf (estimating the effect of the proposed PPACA
on health care coverage and the federal budget).  
  See, e.g., Joint Commission on Taxation, JCT report on House5
Reconciliation Bill H.R. 4872 (Report JCX-16-10), (March 18,
2010), accessible at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=sta
rtdown&id=3671. (estimating the effect of the proposed PPACA on
the federal budget).
  See, e.g., Davis, Karen, et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: An6
International Update on the Comparative Performance of




(comparing the United States to other industrialized countries on
a number of measures regarding performance of the health care
system). 
  See, e.g., Organisation for Economic and Cooperative7
Development, OECD.StatExtracts, at http://stats.oecd.org/index.
aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT (setting forth data regarding
health and health care within a number of industrialized
countries).
  See, e.g., World Health Organization, World Health Report 2000,8
at http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/ (measuring and comparing
the health of the population of different countries).
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Kaiser Family Foundation,  and Families USA.  9 10
Congress also was free to consider the voluminous
literature published by health care economists  as11
well as their testimony before Congress.12
All of the foregoing economic factors had to be
considered in designing this complex, comprehensive
scheme of legislation.  In the words of the District
Court below, the various elements of the PPACA are a
“finely crafted watch,” containing “approximately 450
separate pieces,” many if not most of which are
interrelated and interdependent.  Florida v. U.S. Dept.
of Health and Human Services, 780 F.Supp.2d 1256,
1304 (N.D. Fla. 2010).  Congress had to choose not only
  See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits9
Annual Survey, available from Kaiser Family Foundation, at
http://ehbs.kff.org/ (tracking increases in the cost of health
insurance, average income, and the cost of living since 1999).
  See, e.g., Families USA, Costly Coverage: Premiums Outpace10
Paychecks (August 2009), at http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/
publications/reports/costly-coverage.html (comparing increases in
cost of health insurance to increases in income and inflation). 
  See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Economic Scholars in Support11
of Defendants-Appellees, Liberty University, Inc., v. Geithner, __
F.3d __ (4  Cir. 2011) (citing numerous studies by economicth
scholars relating to the necessity of the individual mandate).
  See, e.g., Rowland, Diane, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate12
Committee on Finance, Medicaid and Health Reform, Kaiser
Family Foundation at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/050
509RowlandTestimony.pdf/; Pearson, Mark, Written Statement to
Special Senate Commission on Aging: Disparities in health
expenditure across OECD countries: Why does the United States
spend so much more than other countries?, OECD (September 30,
2009), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf.
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from a competing set of economic models and theories
but also had to decide how to combine the hundreds of
moving parts of this Act into a comprehensive and
unified scheme of economic regulation.  This was a
matter of legislative prerogative and is beyond judicial
competency.  
In the exercise of its lawmaking function, Congress
is not only permitted but expected to take economic
data and expert economic opinion into account in
determining whether to enact a system of universal
health care coverage and in deciding what form that
system should take.  While judges as individuals are
as capable as legislators at understanding and acting
upon this information, it is incompatible with their
judicial role to bring these considerations to the
interpretation of the Constitution.  The role of the
courts is limited to determining whether Congress had




The United States Constitution does not grant the
courts any role in the development of economic policy. 
This power is instead conferred upon Congress.
Accordingly, the individual mandate contained in the





       Counsel of Record
29475 Bryce Road
Pepper Pike, OH 44124
(216) 789-0507
whuhn@uakron.edu 
